Renewable energy crowdlending in 2026: which platforms to choose, and which projects to avoid

If you are looking for the most solid corner of French crowdfunding, renewable energy is still the answer in 2026. The segment raised 358 million euros in 2025, recorded no definitive loss that year and delivered an average gross return of 7.7% ^[8][9]. In real estate, over the same period, 20 to 25% of projects are in collective insolvency proceedings ^[10][26]. But choosing the platform is no longer enough. After two acquisitions, the four best-known names in the sector now form just two groups, Enerfip (with Lumo) and Lendocompany (Lendosphere and Lendopolis) ^[1][4][5][6]. And 2026 brought some very visible accidents: the liquidation of TELI SAS, issuer of a bond placed on Enerfip for the Carbon solar-panel factory project ^[18][28], the court reorganisation of Ventus Energy, a "green" offer that held no crowdfunding licence ^[20][21], and, on 1 October, a reported repayment risk on a development loan placed on Lendosphere ^[30].

Our short answer: pick one of the two licensed groups, then focus most of your attention on the project. A loan to the company that runs an already built plant, whose electricity is sold under contract, does not carry the same risk as a bond financing a portfolio of projects still in development, a factory, or an unregulated foreign platform. In our data, the average score falls as the coupon rises: 70.2/100 below 7%, 64.6 between 7 and 9%, 58.2 above 9%. A higher rate is not a free bonus. Most of the time it signals a different kind of risk.

The market in 2026: what the numbers say

According to the Forvis Mazars and France FinTech barometer as reported in the press, French crowdfunding raised 1.763 billion euros in 2025, up 1.8%. Renewable energy accounted for 358 million euros (+1.7%) across 407 projects, a number up 31.2% ^[8] (another presentation of the same barometer gives +24% ^[9]). Solar represents 70% of the amounts, wind 8% and anaerobic digestion 5% ^[9]. Energy now exceeds 20% of total fundraising ^[10]. For the wider market picture, see our 2025 crowdlending barometer.

On risk, the contrast with real estate is stark. According to the same review, "no definitive loss was recorded in this specific segment in 2025" for renewables, and delays of under six months stayed below 2% ^[9]. In real estate, 8 to 10% of projects show delays of under six months, 25 to 30% delays of more than six months, and 20 to 25% are in collective proceedings ^[10]. An advisory firm that follows the sector gives the same order of magnitude for collective proceedings, against 4 to 6% in June 2024 ^[26]. Two platforms ceased operating in 2025 ^[10].

One caveat matters: these figures are not like-for-like. For renewables, the source does not say whether the 2% is a share of projects or of amounts, and gives no figure for delays of more than six months, whereas the real-estate figures are shares of projects. The gap is still large, but you should not derive a precise ratio from it. Our detailed platform-by-platform delay comparison is in our article on delay rates.

The price of this relative safety is a lower return. The average gross return in real estate is 11% ^[8]. Across the 158 real-estate projects in our database with a stated rate, the average is 10.55%. On the three main renewable platforms, our averages range from 6.70% to 8.12% (table below).

Tax has also moved. Since 1 January 2026, the French flat tax (PFU) has risen from 30% to 31.4% (12.8% income tax plus 18.6% social levies), and it applies by default to investment income such as interest and bonds ^[11][12]. The official texts do not mention crowdfunding bonds explicitly, but nothing suggests they are exempt. A 7% gross coupon therefore becomes roughly 4.8% net. Our crowdlending tax guide, published in March 2026, still uses the 30% rate: use 31.4% in your calculations.

Two groups, not four platforms

The landscape has changed in a year. Lendosphere and Lendopolis are now two brands of a single licensed company, Lendocompany, a crowdfunding service provider (PSFP) under number FP-2023-22, licensed on 7 November 2023, according to the AMF white list ^[1]. Lendosphere, part of the 123 Investment Managers group, had bought 100% of Lendopolis in November 2024, according to MoneyVox (a page that carries a promotional code, so partly commercial) ^[6]. The two companies merged into Lendocompany at the end of 2025, and most of Lendopolis's fundraising now goes through the La Banque Postale network, according to L'Info Durable ^[7].

Lendosphere's statistics page shows 471,072,331 euros raised, 849 projects presented of which 837 completed, 47,512 lenders, under 1% of outstanding more than 60 days late, and 3 unpaid projects ^[3]. Lendopolis claims more than 420 million euros raised, 883 projects funded, a minimum ticket of 20 or 100 euros, and 23,983 active lenders in November 2025 ^[6]. Note that the press repeats a "zero defaults to date" line about the group ^[7], while Lendosphere's own page reports 3 unpaid projects ^[3]. Platforms do not define default the same way, and the figure the platform itself publishes is the one to rely on.

On the other side, Enerfip bought Lumo in November 2025, after a year in which Lumo's revenue had fallen by about two thirds, according to CFNEWS ^[5]. Lumo now describes itself as "a commercial brand of Enerfip" and claims, for its own history, 32,000 users, 230 million euros and 263 projects ^[4]. At both Enerfip and Lumo, the investor pays no fees ^[4]: the project owner pays the platform a success fee, with a secondary market (Enerdeal) and a 10-euro minimum ticket, according to an older affiliate review ^[24].

What we could not verify: Enerfip's current statistics. Its performance page did not respond to our requests, and the figures in circulation do not reconcile. An affiliate site reported in January 2026 a total of 562 million euros since 2014 and the platform's claim that "no definitive loss has been recorded to date" ^[23]. That claim predates the TELI SAS liquidation. The licence, on the other hand, can be checked: Enerfip SAS is on the AMF white list as a crowdfunding service provider under number FP-2022-2, licensed on 6 December 2022, with the trading name "Enerfip - Lumo" ^[27].

Alongside these two groups, Miimosa is a licensed PSFP (FP-2024-5) ^[2], focused on agriculture with a few energy projects.

The practical consequence: splitting your money between Lendosphere and Lendopolis does not diversify platform risk. It is the same licensed entity. If you want two separate counterparties, you need an account in each group.

CrowdPickr data: energy projects scored between May and 1 October 2026. Rates and terms computed on projects with a stated rate (69 of 70 for Enerfip). Open offers at our latest pass on each platform (17 September 2026 for Lendopolis, 1 October for Enerfip and Lendosphere).

How should you read these scores? Enerfip's lower average does not mean the platform is less serious. Enerfip has the widest and most dispersed offer, from 40 to 84 out of 100, with more high-coupon developer bonds. Lendopolis, by contrast, lists more homogeneous projects, all rated FAVORABLE or RECOMMANDÉ by our engine. On the platform track-record criterion alone, our sub-scores were 22.5/25 for Enerfip, 22.0/25 for Lendopolis and 19.9/25 for Lendosphere, which does not explicitly publish realised versus announced returns. These sub-scores rely on default data that predate the TELI SAS liquidation and the risk reported at Lendosphere in October 2026: they must not be read as a current "0% default" for Enerfip or for Lendosphere.

Why renewable loans have held up, and what is changing

The segment's resilience has nothing to do with projects being "green". It comes from their revenue. A plant that wins a tender run by the French energy regulator (CRE) receives a "contrat de complément de rémunération", a public top-up contract on the electricity it produces, set up under the French Energy Code. The April 2026 specification for small solar even includes a premium that partly compensates the producer when negative-price hours exceed 15 in a year ^[14]. For a lender, that is the key point: repayment depends on a largely contracted cash flow, not on a commercial bet.

Developers also have a regulatory reason to come to retail investors. In the larger PPE2 tenders, local or participatory financing is a scoring criterion: according to the photovoltaique.info portal, the commitment covers 10% of the financing provided locally for three years, and failing to meet it reduces the reference tariff used to calculate the top-up ^[15]. This text comes from a secondary portal, and we could not verify the exact thresholds or the definition of "local". Notably, in the April 2026 specification for small solar (100 to 500 kWp), we found no bonus linked to participatory financing ^[14]. That finding applies to this tender only.

Two new pressures deserve watching. First, negative prices: according to the RTE review reported by Selectra (a site that also runs a commercial comparison business), France had 513 negative-price hours in 2025, against 352 in 2024, and prices collapse mostly at midday because of solar output. Solar capacity, at 30.4 GW, overtook hydro ^[17]. Second, support for small installations has fallen: since 5 June 2026, the feed-in tariff for new installations of 100 kWp or less is a single rate of 1.1 euro cents per kWh, investment premiums are removed, and installations of 100 to 500 kWp go through the simplified tender ^[16].

Our reading: a plant already in service under contract remains protected by its remuneration framework. New projects, especially those that would sell part of their output without a contract, are more exposed to falling midday prices. Always ask which contract covers the output, and for how many years.

Not all "green" projects are equal

This is the heart of the matter. Behind the renewable label, we see four very different risk profiles. And the label itself no longer guarantees anything: the public "Financement participatif pour la croissance verte" label has ended, according to the French Ministry for the Ecological Transition ^[13]. Calling a project "green" is now a self-declaration.

1. The operating plant under contract

This is the historical profile of renewable crowdlending: a loan to the project company that owns a built and grid-connected solar or wind farm whose electricity is sold under contract. The main risks are production and the strength of the sponsor. The segment's reputation rests on this type of project.

2. The development portfolio

Here, you lend to a holding company that finances projects not yet built. An example from our database: the "Incisol Dev 3 - Solstice T2" bond on Enerfip, at 9.5% over 34 months, repaid in fine (capital at maturity), which funds the development of 37 projects meant to be sold once ready to build, most of them "still in an early development phase". A project in development may never obtain its permit or grid connection. Repayment then depends on the developer's ability to sell or refinance its portfolio, not on a contracted electricity cash flow.

This profile is not specific to Enerfip. On 1 October 2026, GreenUnivers reported that "a risk of non-repayment hangs over a loan taken out in 2025 from Lendosphere savers by Eolfi, a subsidiary of Langa International", and that the risk "covers 91 MW comprising 3 solar projects and 6 wind farms to be built" ^[30]. The full article is paywalled: we do not know the amount, the rate or the cause, and at this stage it is a reported risk, not an established default. This project is not in our database.

To measure the effect, we sorted the 119 projects on the three main platforms by whether their summary contains the words "développement", "pipeline" or "holding". The 42 matching projects have an average score of 61.0 and an average rate of 8.05%, against 67.4 and 7.32% for the other 77. This keyword sort is crude (the word "développement" can appear in the summary of an operating plant): treat it as an indication, not a measurement.

3. The industrial project

The most visible accident of 2026 on a licensed platform falls into this category. On Enerfip, 2,379 investors put 2,963,040 euros into TELI SAS, the company that carries the bond debt of the Carbon solar-panel factory project, and TELI SAS is in judicial liquidation ^[28]. According to Kohen Avocats (a law-firm blog that also markets its services to investors), the funds, net of platform fees, were passed to Carbon SAS as a shareholder current-account loan, and Enerfip is filing a claim on behalf of all 2,379 investors ^[18]. Enerfip itself warns that "it is unlikely that investors will recover a significant share of the capital invested" ^[28]. In May 2026, Carbon abandoned its 1.5 billion euro photovoltaic gigafactory project in Fos-sur-Mer, saying that "no visibility exists today on the emergence of such a market" ^[19].

What matters for investors is the nature of the risk: Carbon was not a plant with contracted revenue but an industrial manufacturing project whose success depended on a market yet to be built. The rate and maturity of this bond are not given in the sources we consulted, and we had not scored the project: it is not in our database. On the Finary community forum, investors report other 2026 incidents on Enerfip, including a default on a Papysun project and delays on several others ^[25]. These are user reports that we could not verify elsewhere.

4. The unlicensed "green" offer

Ventus Energy Group OÜ, a Tallinn company ^[20] that raised retail savings to finance energy assets (cogeneration and heat, solar, batteries, wind) ^[21][29], illustrates the last profile. On 24 June 2026, the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) published a warning stating that the company is not authorised to provide banking services requiring a licence in Austria, and therefore not permitted to accept funds from other parties as deposits ^[20]. The Estonian regulator republished that warning ^[20]. The German regulator BaFin had earlier issued an order against Ventus, according to a German law firm that is soliciting affected investors ^[22]; the date of that order varies between sources.

According to P2P Empire, an affiliate site, Harju County Court opened reorganisation proceedings over Ventus Energy Group OÜ on 18 August 2026. The same site reports 95.1 million euros outstanding, 6,485 investors and no performing loans, and says Ventus appealed the BaFin order ^[21]. We did not consult the Estonian court register. On 25 September 2026, Ventus published a summary of a reorganisation plan which, according to the company, provides for repayment of 100% of principal over up to five years, with an option to convert claims into shares, against total liabilities it puts at 86.0 million euros ^[29]. This is the company's proposal, not an agreed outcome, and its figures do not match P2P Empire's. A reorganisation is not a liquidation, and its outcome is unknown.

Our engine scored the project "17.4 MW Wind Park Lithuania BESS Addition Round 5" on 19 May 2026: 2/100, verdict ÉVITER (avoid), for a 15.12% rate over 87 months. The main reason: no identifiable licence, neither an AMF PSFP licence nor a European passport, with the platform itself stating that it operates without a crowdfunding licence. In fairness, this score came after the BaFin order: we did not get ahead of every regulator. See the Ventus Energy page.

What our data shows

On the three main platforms, the score falls steadily as the coupon rises:

Two caveats. First, a moderate coupon guarantees nothing: among the lowest-rated projects are the Dosnon wind farm repowering on Lendosphere (7.5%, 46.8/100) and the Pont-du-Château solar park on the same platform (7.5%, 47.8/100), both rated PRUDENCE, as well as Trinité Surzur Bail on Enerfip (8%, 43/100). Second, 106 of the 119 projects (89%) are repaid in fine: capital only comes back at maturity, often after three to four years. Throughout that period, you carry the risk on the full amount lent.

The checklist before you subscribe

• The licence. Check the platform on the AMF white list of crowdfunding providers. An offer without a crowdfunding licence should be ruled out, whatever its rate.
• The issuer and what it owns. A project company that owns a plant, a development holding and an industrial company do not carry the same risk. Our guide on how to read a crowdlending project file explains where to find this information.
• The status of the asset. Is the plant built, connected, under a top-up or feed-in contract? For how many years?
• The rate. In our data, above 9% you should expect development or industrial risk. Treat it as close to equity and size it accordingly.
• Repayment profile and term. In fine dominates. A long in fine term concentrates the risk at the end.
• The word "green". There is no public label any more ^[13]. Ignore it in your analysis.
• Real diversification. Lendosphere and Lendopolis are one company ^[1]. Spread across both groups and, above all, across many projects and project owners.
• Net return. Think after the 31.4% flat tax ^[11].

To compare with other segments, see our selection of the best crowdlending platforms in 2026, which this article complements and refines for renewable energy.

Sources

1. PSFP white list: Lendocompany, AMF, accessed 2 October 2026.
2. PSFP white list: Groupe MiiMOSA, AMF, accessed 2 October 2026.
3. Statistiques, Lendosphere, accessed 2 October 2026.
4. Home page, Lumo (an Enerfip brand), accessed 2 October 2026.
5. Lumo s'adosse à un montpelliérain, CFNEWS, 20 November 2025.
6. Lendopolis, MoneyVox (page with a promotional code), November 2025 data.
7. Financement participatif : pourquoi les EnR tiennent quand le reste décroche, L'Info Durable, 21 January 2026.
8. Le financement participatif rebondit de 1,8 % en 2025 : 1,7 milliard d'euros, L'Info Durable, 12 March 2026.
9. Les Français investissent dans les énergies renouvelables : 358 millions d'euros mobilisés en 2025, Les-energies-renouvelables.eu, 14 March 2026.
10. Crowdfunding en France : la collecte repart légèrement en 2025 à 1,76 milliard d'euros, Finyear, March 2026.
11. Taxation: Evolution of the Single Flat-Rate Levy (PFU), Service-public.fr (Entreprendre), effective 1 January 2026.
12. Revenus d'épargne et de placement : revenus 2026, Service-public.fr, accessed 2 October 2026.
13. Label financement participatif, French Ministry for the Ecological Transition, accessed 2 October 2026.
14. Cahier des charges PPE2 Petit PV (100-500 kWc), CRE, April 2026.
15. Appels d'offres CRE 5 PPE2, photovoltaique.info, accessed 2 October 2026.
16. Arrêté S21 : détail des modifications et nouveau tarif unique, photovoltaique.info, June 2026.
17. Bilan électrique RTE 2025, Selectra, early 2026.
18. Projet Carbon abandonné : que peuvent faire les investisseurs après la liquidation de TELI SAS ?, Kohen Avocats (law-firm blog), 24 August 2026.
19. Abandon d'un projet de giga-usine photovoltaïque à Fos-sur-Mer, L'Info Durable, 19 May 2026.
20. The FMA warns about offerings by Ventus Energy Group OÜ, FMA (Austria), republished by the Estonian FSA, 24 June 2026.
21. Ventus Energy review, P2P Empire (affiliate site), updated 2026.
22. Ventus Energy: Geld zurück, anwalt24.de (Kanzlei Oelschig, law-firm marketing), 9 June 2026.
23. Enerfip avis, Détective Banque (affiliate site), 6 January 2026.
24. Avis Enerfip, S'investir (affiliate site), undated.
25. Retours d'expérience récents sur Enerfip, Finary community forum, April to August 2026.
26. Crowdfunding immobilier : taux de défaut, retards… le bilan 2025, Fortuny Conseil (advisory and affiliate site), 10 April 2026.
27. PSFP white list: Enerfip SAS, AMF, accessed 2 October 2026.
28. Point à propos du projet Carbon, Enerfip, updated 19 May 2026.
29. Reorganisation Plan: Executive Summary for Creditors, Ventus Energy (company statement), 25 September 2026.
30. Lendosphere confrontée à un risque de défaut sur des projets de Langa International, GreenUnivers (paywalled, standfirst read), 1 October 2026.

CrowdPickr data as of 1 October 2026. This article is an independent analysis and does not constitute investment advice.