Koregraf, 18 months after it shut down: what happened, where investors stand, and the warning signs to check on your platforms

In April 2025, a Bordeaux real estate crowdfunding platform founded in 2014, licensed by the AMF and owned for just over nine months by an established financial group, announced that it was shutting down. This was not a fragile start-up: in June 2024, Koregraf claimed more than 292 million euros raised, 397 projects financed and 189 repaid^[7]. On 20 May 2025, the Bordeaux commercial court ordered its judicial liquidation without continuation of activity^[1][3].

What happened fits in one sentence: Koregraf's closure did not make the projects disappear, it shifted their recovery onto investors, who had to pay for it, organise it and wait. Eighteen months later, no public source gives an overall figure for what has been recovered, and bondholders are moving forward project by project, in court. For anyone investing today, the lesson is not to steer clear of real estate crowdfunding. It is to check, on your own platforms, the points the Koregraf case makes concrete: a recent change of owner or management, default statistics that never speak for themselves, and who would represent bondholders if the platform disappeared.

What happened, date by date

Koregraf was not an unknown name. It was created in 2014, first under the name CROWDFUNDING-IMMO^[3][15], and it was dedicated to financing property development, with a minimum ticket of 2,000 euros, according to a specialist directory with an affiliate slant^[15]. Investors subscribed to bonds, and Koregraf acted as the representative of the bondholders' masse^[14]. It obtained the European crowdfunding service provider (PSFP) licence, number FP-2023-34, on 14 November 2023^[1][2].

Two points in this timeline deserve attention. First, we found no safeguard or reorganisation stage: the court went straight to liquidation. Second, the platform organised its own exit before the judgment. Koregraf resigned as representative of the bondholders' masse, according to messages posted on the MoneyVox forum^[14], and the work was handed to three providers: PS Trustee as masse representative, 15-63 for recovery and Capsens as technical operator of the run-off^[8][9]. The AMF names Capsens as the provider in charge of the run-off under the business continuity plan, and invites investors to contact it^[1].

At the time of the closure, about 160 million euros were still awaiting repayment, according to Boursorama^[6]. The blog of Weelim, an advisory firm that works with partner platforms, mentions 198 projects in progress and says about half were healthy according to the company^[9]. A low-reliability blog, Planetdiag, puts it closer to about 41% sound projects^[16]. None of these figures comes from a primary document. We give them as an order of magnitude, not as a balance sheet. The total number of investors was never published, but an investor association had more than 1,000 members^[6].

Why the platform shut down

The available sources describe market causes, and that is what makes the case instructive. Boursorama cites the new-build housing crisis, higher interest rates and the complexity of recovery^[6]. Weelim adds the collapse in fundraising, rising defaults and delays, and recovery costs that the shareholder Inter Invest no longer wanted to bear^[9]. For its part, Koregraf says it "a bien cherché plusieurs solutions" (did look for several solutions)^[8].

The mechanism is simple: a platform lives on fees from new fundraising. When fundraising dries up, its revenue falls just as its portfolio demands the most work. It can become unprofitable before a single project has been written off.

The sector context confirms the pressure. According to Boursorama, crowdfunding raised 1.7 billion euros in 2024, down 17.1%^[6]. In 2025, total fundraising stabilised at 1.763 billion euros (+1.8%), but real estate fell again, to 845 million euros over 1,004 projects against 861 million over 1,139 projects in 2024, according to the Forvis Mazars and France FinTech barometer reported by MoneyVox, which notes that "la crise immobilière se prolonge" (the property crisis is dragging on)^[10].

The most telling figure concerns developers. According to the reading of the barometer published by JeChange, a comparison site paid through affiliation, the share of real estate projects whose developer is in collective proceedings went from 6 to 8% at end 2024 to 10 to 15% in the first half of 2025, then to 20 to 25% at end 2025. Over the same period, the share of projects more than six months late went from 15 to 20% to 25 to 30%. Definitive losses, estimated at 4 to 6% at end 2024 and in the first half of 2025, are no longer quantified at end 2025^[11]. JeChange sums up the trap: "Une perte faible aujourd'hui peut aussi traduire une perte pas encore enregistrée" (a low loss today may also reflect a loss not yet recorded)^[11]. We were not able to consult the original barometer document.

One point needs to be stated plainly: none of the sources consulted alleges a conflict of interest or a link between Koregraf and the project owners, and we found neither an AMF sanction against the company or its managers nor a criminal complaint. The European regulation in fact bars a platform from accepting as project owners its shareholders holding 20% or more, its managers and its employees^[4]. Koregraf is the case of a business model that did not survive a market downturn, not a case of established fraud.

Where investors stand in late 2026

The deadline against the platform has passed

The deadline to file a claim against Koregraf itself ran for two months from the BODACC publication of 31 May 2025, so until roughly the end of July 2025^[3]. It expired long ago. But for most investors, that is not the main point: your claim is not against the platform, it is against the issuing company, meaning the project company that received the money.

A ruling reported by a law firm illustrates this. According to that firm, the Bordeaux court of appeal held that the platform's status as a crowdfunding investment adviser was "sans incidence sur la qualification du créancier" (irrelevant to who the creditor is), the bondholders being the "seuls prêteurs des fonds et seuls créanciers" (sole lenders of the funds and sole creditors)^[13]. In practice, it is the masse representative who holds the right to sue on behalf of bondholders (article L.228-54 of the French Commercial Code), and an individual action is likely to be ruled inadmissible, again according to the same firm^[12].

The 2026 rulings, to be read with caution

A Paris law firm, Kohen Avocats, reports several decisions handed down in 2026 in Koregraf cases. Its articles carry the notice "Article généré par une intelligence artificielle, selon un processus conçu et contrôlé par le cabinet" (article generated by artificial intelligence, using a process designed and controlled by the firm), and we found these decisions in no public database and no other media. They should therefore be taken as reported, unconfirmed information:

• France Immo Invest 1. The summary-proceedings judge of the Paris economic activities court reportedly ordered on 1 July 2026 the delivery of four guarantees, under a penalty of 2,000 euros per day of delay and per commitment, then on 21 September 2026 the payment of a provision of 5,987,985.45 euros to PS Trustee, on behalf of three bondholder masses. The principal subscribed is said to be 4,013,170 euros, by 457 bondholders. According to the firm, the bondholders had accepted a protocol in January 2026 under which they gave up 22% of their claim in exchange for new guarantees. A summary order is provisional and does not decide the merits^[12].
• J2L Invest 1. On 7 October 2026, the Bordeaux court of appeal reportedly upheld the order against the president of a property development company, as guarantor, to pay 299,750 euros to the bondholders of a 272,000-euro bond issue placed via Koregraf in 2021 (the attendance sheet of one meeting listed 81 bondholders). The issuer's liquidation had been closed for insufficient assets on 15 October 2025^[13].
• Ad Hoc Capital. On 8 October 2026, in a case where Koregraf was the initial masse representative, the Paris economic activities court reportedly admitted the new representative of one bond issue and fixed that masse's claim at 976,348.69 euros against the issuer, which is in liquidation with no identified assets according to the firm. It reportedly rejected the representative of a second issue, who could not prove he had been validly appointed^[18].
• Nexalia. On 20 May 2026, the Mulhouse court reportedly allowed two bondholder masses to file their claims late in the liquidation of the holding company Nexalia, including the masse of a 2021 issue placed by Koregraf. On 9 April 2026, the same court reportedly ruled inadmissible an action brought by a single bondholder acting alone^[19].

These cases show that guarantees taken on developers can still have effect after the platform has gone, and that whether the masse representative was validly appointed matters as much as the merits. They say nothing about the other projects. A claim fixed against an issuer with no assets may never be paid, and a provision ordered in summary proceedings is not a repayment received.

Recovery funded by investors

This is the most uncomfortable part of the story. According to discussions on the MoneyVox forum, recovery was to be funded, project by project, by collecting fee advances from volunteer investors, and the draft resolutions stated that "la règle du 1er arrivé, 1er servi sera appliquée" (the first come, first served rule will apply)^[14]. The proposed fees for the masse representative are quoted there at 24,000 euros including tax in one draft resolution, then 2,640 euros including tax per half-year in a later version^[14]. Some investors felt this mechanism was questionable with regard to equal treatment of bondholders (article L.228-68). That is a forum opinion, not a court ruling. Other investors objected that the three providers had been chosen without a tender, called it a "manœuvre de contournement" (a workaround manoeuvre), and wrote to the AMF^[8].

The AMF drew the general lesson one month after the liquidation. In a warning of 18 June 2025, it reminds investors that every PSFP must have a business continuity plan, but that its functions "peuvent ne pas inclure des actions ne rentrant pas dans le champ des obligations du PSFP" (may not include actions outside the scope of the provider's obligations), and that investors risk ending up "seul face au porteur de projet" (alone facing the project owner), and bearing the costs, if no representative was appointed upfront^[5].

What you can still do

• Check your positions with Capsens, which the AMF presents as the run-off provider under the business continuity plan^[1].
• Identify the masse representative for each of your projects. PS Trustee was appointed to take over this role at the closure^[8], but some masses have changed representative since, and the 8 October 2026 judgment shows that the validity of an appointment can be challenged^[18].
• If a claims deadline against an issuer was missed, relief from the time bar can still be requested under strict conditions and deadlines, as in Mulhouse^[19]. Raise it with the masse representative.
• Join forces. Holders of one thirtieth of the bonds of a masse can request a general meeting (article L.228-58)^[12].
• Refuse paid "recovery" intermediaries. Kohen Avocats itself warns against such approaches^[12].

For how to file a claim in the more recent failures, see our guide platform failures in 2026: how to file your claim. Our article on the Tudigo liquidation also returns to the Koregraf precedent on masse representative fees.

Five signals you can check today

Koregraf is not an isolated case. WeShareBonds had closed a few months earlier, in December, according to Boursorama^[6]. The AMF register lists six other PSFPs struck off between December 2025 and July 2026, the most recent being Crowdybee on 31 July 2026, without giving a reason for any of them^[2]. The signals below do not predict a failure. They show where to look.

1. A change of owner is not a guarantee

Inter Invest's purchase of Koregraf was presented as solid backing: "Le Groupe Inter Invest partage notre vision" (the Inter Invest group shares our vision), said Arnaud Le Prince, Koregraf's managing director, at the time^[7]. Just over nine months later, the platform announced its closure. The BODACC also shows two changes of president a year apart, in February 2024 and February 2025^[3]. Weelim reports that the shareholder no longer wanted to bear recovery costs^[9]: a new shareholder can reassess the cost of a difficult portfolio and stop carrying it.

In our scoring grid, a platform taken over after collective proceedings gets 1 point out of 4 for financial health until it has had twelve months of stability under its new owner. This is the case for WiSEED, which our engine describes as having come out of an accelerated reorganisation opened in October 2025, with a takeover by Advenis. Our engine applies the same twelve-month threshold to Afranga, relaunched in 2025 under a new owner (CrowdPickr data). A simple change of shareholder, like Koregraf's, is not penalised automatically: it is up to you to spot it. The pattern of a takeover followed by a run-off was also seen at October. A takeover or a sudden change of management is a reason to slow down, not to relax.

2. Read the default rate, and how it is defined

The European regulation requires platforms to publish each year the default rates of the projects they offer (article 20)^[4]. But a rate never speaks for itself. At the time of its closure, about 22% of Koregraf's ongoing projects were in collective proceedings, according to a low-reliability blog^[16], and the sector barometer points out that a low loss may be a loss not yet recognised^[11]. We were not able to find the statistics Koregraf published before it closed.

Here is what four platforms we track publish, as read by us on their official indicators page on 27 October 2026. Definitions and scope differ: these figures cannot be compared with one another, and this table is not a ranking.

These four pages show why a single figure is not enough. At Bricks and PretUp, no project appears as more than six months late, even though their default rates exceed 6% in some years and PretUp has 52 projects in collective proceedings: a project in difficulty can appear on one line and not on another, and at Bricks an amicable agreement takes a project out of default. At Les Entreprêteurs, the rate covers loans only. The counter-intuitive reading is the right one: a platform that publishes its difficulties is being transparent, not necessarily badly run. Conversely, a constant 0% since 2018 should prompt a question, not provide comfort: how would a project in difficulty be counted? We have no established evidence that BienPrêter's figure is inaccurate, but its page does not answer that question. For a more detailed reading, see our article on delay rates by platform.

3. The continuity plan guarantees administration, not recovery

Every PSFP must describe a business continuity plan in its licence application (article 12(2)(j) of Regulation 2020/1503)^[4]. At Koregraf, the plan worked in the sense that a provider, Capsens, took over the run-off^[1]. But the AMF points out that it may not cover recovery actions^[5]. According to a crowdfunding software vendor, investors also complained of long periods without news^[17].

Before investing, check in the key investment information sheet who would represent bondholders if the platform disappeared: an independent masse representative, appointed at issuance, or the platform itself. Our guide how to read a crowdlending project file explains where to find this information.

4. Leverage and concentration

The developers financed by Koregraf were hit by the same crisis at the same time. In our data, out of 142 real estate projects with a stated loan-to-value ratio (LTV), spread across eight French platforms, 26 exceed 80%: 6 out of 19 at ClubFunding, 11 out of 46 at Bricks and 6 out of 32 at La Première Brique (CrowdPickr data). A high LTV leaves little margin if the property's value falls or sales slow down: it is not a flaw in itself, but a factor to weigh.

5. Diversify across platforms, not only across projects

A Koregraf investor who had spread their savings across many projects saw the recovery of every one of them handed to the same three providers^[8]. Diversifying by project does not protect against platform risk. Limiting the share of your savings placed on any single platform remains the simplest protection. Our crowdlending barometer gives the market context.

What we do not know

• How much investors have recovered. No source publishes an overall recovery figure to date.
• The ORIAS removal in March 2021. Only one specialist directory states that the crowdfunding investment adviser status was struck off at that date, with management calling it an administrative issue^[15]. We have not verified it.
• The text of the 2026 rulings, which we could not find in public databases^{[12][13][18][19]}.
• The default statistics Koregraf used to publish. The site is closed and we could not find them.
• The European regulation was read through a mirror: only the official text published on EUR-Lex (CELEX 32020R1503) prevails^[4].

Sources

1. Withdrawal of KOREGRAF's authorisation as a crowdfunding service provider, AMF, 8 September 2025.
2. Liste des PSFP radiés (list of struck-off crowdfunding providers), AMF, page viewed on 14 October 2026.
3. BODACC notice A202501043351 and related notices (SIREN 807 672 977), DILA / BODACC, 31 May 2025.
4. Regulation (EU) 2020/1503 of 7 October 2020 on European crowdfunding service providers for business, LawPlayer (mirror; the official EUR-Lex text, CELEX 32020R1503, prevails).
5. Financement participatif : l'AMF appelle les investisseurs à la plus grande vigilance sur les risques encourus, AMF, 18 June 2025.
6. Crowdfunding immobilier : un secteur sous tension après la chute d'un acteur emblématique, Boursorama, 26 May 2025.
7. Inter Invest acquisition of Koregraf, Monimmeuble, 11 July 2024.
8. Alors que Koregraf ferme, certains investisseurs organisent la riposte, Idéal Investisseur, 7 April 2025.
9. Faillite de Koregraf : quelles leçons tirer pour le crowdfunding immobilier en 2025, Weelim (blog of an advisory firm working with partner platforms), 9 April 2025.
10. Crowdfunding : après deux années de repli, un signe de reprise encourageant, MoneyVox, 12 March 2026.
11. Crowdfunding immobilier : 1 projet sur 4 a plus de 6 mois de retard, pas de perte, JeChange (affiliate comparison site), 18 October 2026.
12. Koregraf : le représentant des obligataires de France Immo Invest 1 obtient une provision de 5,99 millions d'euros, Cabinet Kohen Avocats (marketing content, AI-generated according to the firm's notice), 1 October 2026.
13. Obligataires de crowdfunding : la caution du promoteur peut-elle échapper au paiement ? (cour d'appel de Bordeaux, 7 octobre 2026, Koregraf), Cabinet Kohen Avocats (marketing content, AI-generated according to the firm's notice), 17 October 2026.
14. Cessation d'activité de la société Koregraf (see also page 3), MoneyVox forum (investor forum), 3 to 19 April 2025.
15. Koregraf, France Transactions (specialist directory with an affiliate slant), undated.
16. Koregraf, Planetdiag (blog, low reliability), undated.
17. When Trust Breaks: Lessons from Koregraf's Shutdown for B2B Crowdfunding Platforms, LenderKit (software vendor), 30 May 2025.
18. Koregraf : obligataires d'Ad Hoc Capital, garantis par In Situ Promotion, qui vous représente après le jugement du 8 octobre 2026, Cabinet Kohen Avocats (marketing content, AI-generated according to the firm's notice), 21 October 2026.
19. Nexalia en liquidation : obligataires de Nexalia Invest Atlantique (Koregraf, WiSEED), ce que les décisions de Mulhouse changent, Cabinet Kohen Avocats (marketing content, AI-generated according to the firm's notice), 10 October 2026.
20. Statistiques, BienPrêter, official indicators page, viewed on 27 October 2026.
21. Performances, Bricks, official indicators page, viewed on 27 October 2026.
22. Statistiques, Les Entreprêteurs, official indicators page, viewed on 27 October 2026.
23. Statistiques, PretUp, official indicators page, viewed on 27 October 2026.

CrowdPickr data as of 27 October 2026. This article is an independent analysis and does not constitute investment advice.